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The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy:  
Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit 
Dallas Burtraw, Rich Sweeney, and Margaret Walls 
Abstract 
Federal policies aimed to slow global warming would impose potentially significant costs on 
households that vary depending on the policy approach that is used. This paper evaluates the effects of a 
carbon dioxide cap-and-trade program on households in each of 11 regions of the country and sorted into 
annual income deciles. We find tremendous variation in the incidence (the distribution of cost) of the 
policy. The most important feature that affects households is how the policy distributes the value created 
by placing a price on CO2 emissions. We evaluate 10 policy alternatives that yield results that range from 
moderately progressive (expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, investments in efficiency and cap-
and-dividend) to severely regressive (reduce income taxes, free distribution to incumbent emitters and 
reduction of the payroll tax). To varying degrees the allocation of the value of emissions allowances 
amplifies or potentially resolves the tradeoff between equity and efficiency. 
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The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy:  
Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit 
Dallas Burtraw, Rich Sweeney, and Margaret Walls 
Executive Summary 
Federal climate policy would impose potentially significant costs on households, 
costs that would vary depending on the policy enacted. Cap and trade remains a leading 
candidate for climate policy because it is expected to be effective in identifying low-cost 
emissions reductions, thereby substantially reducing the overall costs to the economy. 
Nonetheless, the distribution of those costs could have serious consequences. Because a 
cap-and-trade policy will put a price on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, it may impose 
costs on households that are many times greater than the resource costs associated with 
achieving emissions reductions.  
The effect on households can be separated into two components. First, the 
introduction of a price on CO2 would be fairly regressive, meaning that it would 
disproportionately affect lower-income households because they spend a larger portion of 
their income on energy expenditures. The second part would depend on how the policy 
distributes the value from the CO2 price—both the value of emissions allowances, if 
allocated for free, and the government revenue collected under an allowance auction.  
This paper evaluates the effects of a cap-and-trade program on households in each 
of 11 regions of the country and sorted into annual income deciles, corresponding to 
effects that would occur in 2015 from policies enacted in 2008. For all policies we 
assume the government retains 35 percent of the allowance value in order to offset its 
own increase in costs at the federal and state level. We examine 10 alternative policies 
and find tremendous variation in their incidence. 
Three types of policies are modestly progressive, including expansion of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, investments in efficiency, and a cap-and-dividend program 
that directly returns revenue to households. Because of its simplicity, we treat cap-and-
dividend as a benchmark. When policies do not use all of the revenue we distribute the 
remaining revenue as (taxable) per capita dividends.  
In contrast, three policies appear severely regressive, even more so than before 
accounting for the use of the revenue. These include grandfathering, reducing the income 
tax, and reducing in the payroll tax. The latter two may have important efficiency Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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advantages—many public finance economists have argued the merits of using revenues 
from auctioned allowances or emissions fees to reduce other distortionary taxes. Our 
results suggest this efficiency advantage may come at a distributional cost as low-income 
households appear to bear a large burden in these scenarios. 
Other policies pose the converse trade-off between efficiency and distributional 
equity. The exclusion of personal transportation or home heating fuels leads to higher 
allowance prices because greater emissions reductions would have to be achieved in other 
sectors. The same is true if allowances are used to compensate electricity consumers, and 
the ramifications are even greater. Although all three of these options appear progressive 
once the allowance revenue is returned as a dividend, this increased progressivity comes 
at the expense of efficiency, and the outcomes are less progressive than cap-and-
dividend.  
Free allocation of emissions allowances to emitters (grandfathering) offers no 
trade off; it is costly and has negative distributional consequences as well. One reason is 
that free allocation directs about 10 percent of the allowance value overseas to foreign 
owners of shareholder equity. Additionally, because the value of the free allowances 
accrues primarily to higher-income households, this option is decidedly regressive.  
To a different end, the equity-efficiency tradeoff is also not apparent in a policy 
that would invest allowance value to improve efficiency in the end use of electricity 
services. Such a policy is one of the most progressive we examined and would lead to 
lower allowance prices, indicating less cost would be imposed on other sectors. However, 
the implementation of this kind of policy is the most problematic of any that we consider.  
While the case for equity across income groups is straightforward, interregional 
equity is more complicated due to differences in preexisting policies, energy prices, 
resources, and lifestyle choices. Nonetheless, important differences emerge, and the 
biggest regional differences affect poor households. Households in the lowest two deciles 
in various regions could incur a welfare loss as high as 10 percent of their income or a 
gain up to 6 percent depending on how revenues are distributed. Low-income households 
in the Northeast, Ohio Valley, and Florida are consistently among the most harmed. 
Although climate change is a long-run problem, it has an important short-run political 
dynamic and the local and regional effects of policy may be fundamentally important to 
building the political coalition necessary to enact climate policy.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy: 
 Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit 
 
Dallas Burtraw, Rich Sweeney, and Margaret Walls ∗ 
1 Introduction 
Federal policies aimed to slow global warming will impose potentially significant 
costs on the economy. The overall costs and their distribution across households will vary 
depending on the policy approach that is used. One criterion to be considered in 
designing a program is the extent to which it disproportionately burdens any one segment 
of the population, especially low-income households. Another criterion to consider is 
regional differences in the cost of the policy, especially because this can have important 
political implications. 
This paper provides evidence for how climate policy may affect different types of 
households and guidance for how those effects can be modified. Several policy scenarios 
are analyzed in each of 11 regions of the country and for households sorted into annual 
income deciles. The model is calibrated to roughly correspond to effects that would occur 
in 2015 from policies enacted in 2008. Our policy scenarios consider a variety of 
potential government remedies for dealing with the impact of climate policy, especially 
on low-income households. 
We focus on a carbon dioxide (CO2) cap-and-trade program, the most likely 
approach to be adopted at the U.S. federal level and already the focus of the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the northeastern states, in California, and in the 
European Union. An incentive-based approach such as cap-and-trade or an emissions fee 
seems well suited to addressing climate change externalities because CO2, the primary 
greenhouse gas leading to global warming, is a uniformly mixing pollutant in the 
atmosphere, and its damage is not related importantly to the location or timing of those 
emissions. Furthermore, there is tremendous variation in the cost of emissions reductions 
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among agents in the economy, and indeed among nations, and incentive-based regulation 
is expected to yield emissions reductions where they are least expensive (Newell and 
Stavins 2003).  
Because a cap-and-trade policy will put a price on CO2, it can have serious 
distributional consequences. This effect has two components. One part depends on how 
the price of CO2 changes expenditures and ultimately consumer surplus throughout the 
economy. The second part depends on how the policy distributes the value from the CO2 
price—both the value of emissions allowances if allocated for free and the government 
revenue collected under an allowance auction (Dinan and Rogers 2002, Parry et al. 2005, 
Boyce and Riddle 2007).  
Existing literature on this topic has analyzed the distributional impacts, mostly by 
income group, of cap-and-trade and carbon taxes with redistribution of auction or tax 
revenues in a lump sum manner (a so-called “cap-and-dividend” or “tax-and-dividend” 
approach) and in the form of reductions in income and other taxes. Some of these studies, 
which we review below, have also considered free allocation (“grandfathering”) of 
allowances. We too consider these kinds of redistribution mechanisms, but we go beyond 
to evaluate a range of other options that are being discussed in policy circles. Our 
mechanisms fall into three broad categories: (1) cap-and-dividend options; (2) 
adjustments to preexisting distortionary taxes; and (3) energy and fuel sector remedies. 
We include as a fourth group a scenario with free allocation of allowances to 
shareholders of incumbent emitting facilities (grandfathering), which has been the 
approach used in most previous emissions trading programs. We consider the following 
specific scenarios:  
(1) Cap-and-dividend options  
•  Per capita dividend of allowance revenues to households, pretax (i.e., 
income taxes would be paid on those dividends) 
•  Per capita dividend of allowance revenues to households, posttax 
(2) Adjustments to preexisting taxes 
•  Reduction in income taxes 
•  Reduction in payroll taxes 
•  Expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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(3) Energy and fuel sector options 
•  Free allocation of allowances to consumers in the electricity sector 
(accomplished by allocation to local distribution companies, i.e., retail 
utilities) 
•  Exemption of transportation sector from the cap-and-trade program 
•  Exemption of home heating sector from the cap-and-trade program 
•  Investment in end-use energy efficiency  
(4) Free allocation to emitters 
•  Grandfathering to incumbent emitters. 
All of the scenarios are evaluated for a constant level of CO2 emissions 
reductions. This means that the overall cost of the program will vary across scenarios 
because the scenarios have different incentive properties and alter relative prices. It is 
noteworthy that if a program inefficiently raises the overall cost of climate policy, it 
would likely increase the cost for all households, even as it may reduce the cost for one 
region or strata of the population relative to another. We calculate the change in the cost 
of the program as reflected in the CO2 price, along with the accompanying distributional 
impacts. We focus both on the distribution of the impacts across income groups and 
across regions. 
We find that the distributional consequences of CO2 pricing policies vary widely 
depending on the structure of the policy and use of revenues. Households in the lowest 
two deciles could incur welfare losses as high as 10 percent of their income or welfare 
gains up to 6 percent of their income depending on how revenues are distributed. Several 
of our policy cases look sharply regressive before the distribution of revenues but 
approximately proportional or progressive after. Only three scenarios remain regressive 
after the return of revenue:  grandfathering, reduction in the income tax, and reduction in 
the payroll tax. The latter two may have important efficiency advantages—many public 
finance economists have argued the merits of using so-called “green” taxes or auctioned 
allowances to reduce other distortionary taxes. Our results suggest that this efficiency 
advantage may come at a distributional cost as low-income households appear to bear a 
large burden in these scenarios. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Some earlier literature has concluded that regional differences from carbon 
policies are likely to be relatively small (Hassett et al. 2007). We find that the range of 
impacts on an average household can be as high as about $550. For example, under a cap-
and-dividend policy (with dividends that are taxable) the average household in the 
Northeast experiences a consumer surplus loss of $1,150 per year while the average 
household in the Northwest loses only $625 per year. However, when expressed as a 
fraction of income, these differences are quite small. Where we do find significant 
differences across regions is for the poorer households. The range of consumer surplus 
losses can be quite high, especially as a percentage of income. Again using cap-and-
dividend as an example, average households in the lowest two deciles may enjoy a 
consumer surplus gain of as much as 3.8 percent of income (in Texas) or incur a 
consumer surplus loss equal to 1.2 percent of income (in the Northeast).  
These results suggest that further explorations into alternative redistribution 
schemes for carbon pricing policies may be called for. Policymakers should be interested 
in finding options that can further reduce the burden on low-income households without 
sacrificing the efficiency of incentive-based options such as cap-and-trade. In addition, a 
more detailed look into the reasons for the regional differences, especially by income 
group, would be worthwhile. 
2  Defining and Measuring Regressivity 
One way to measure the distributional impact of a policy would be to look at the 
absolute measure of cost born by different types of households. However, because this 
absolute measure does not take into account the relative ability to pay, most incidence 
analyses focus on the cost of a policy relative to some measure of ability to pay. Ideally, a 
person’s ability to pay would be measured on the basis of her “lifetime income” or 
“permanent income,” that is, the discounted stream of earnings over her lifetime. 
However, such measures can only be constructed based on panel data, which is difficult 
to come by.1  Some authors have constructed proxies for lifetime income based on age, 
education, and other factors (Rogers 1993; Casperson and Metcalf 1994; Bull, et al. 
Hassett, and Metcalf, 1994; Walls and Hanson 1999; Hassett et al. 2007). Still others 
have relied on annual consumption expenditures as a proxy for lifetime income on the 
basis of the permanent income hypothesis that annual consumption is a relatively 
constant proportion of lifetime income (Poterba 1989; West 2004).  
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In our analysis, we use annual income, net of taxes and transfers, as the basis to 
assess the ability to pay for households as reported in the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CEX) for 2004–2006. Although it is well known that most taxes look more regressive 
using annual income rather than lifetime income (Fullerton and Rogers 1993), and this 
caveat should be kept in mind when viewing our results, some experts have argued that 
there is merit in using annual income. Barthold (1993) argues that it is politically 
impractical to talk about lifetime income both because of the inherent uncertainty in 
measuring it and because of the shorter time horizons of elected officials and the voting 
public. Empirical evidence about whether the permanent, or lifetime, income hypothesis 
is observed in household behavior is mixed (Shapiro and Slemrod 1994).  
  Most incidence studies calculate tax expenditures, based on pretax 
consumption levels, relative to income (or some other measure of ability to pay) and 
report averages for income deciles or quintiles. We go beyond the expenditure calculation 
by allowing for demand responses to higher carbon prices and calculating changes in 
consumer surplus.2  We assume almost all of the price effects are passed forward to 
consumers and we account for 
•  Changes in direct fuel and energy costs; 
•  Changes in indirect costs from embodied energy in consumer goods and services; 
and 
•  Redistribution of allowance auction revenues (as dictated by the different 
scenarios we analyze). 
The only instance in which the carbon pricing policy does not fully pass through 
to consumers is in the case of the electricity sector, where we use a detailed model to 
account for the long-lived nature of plants and equipment. We discuss this situation more 
carefully in Section 6.3. Although we allow for some behavioral responses to higher 
carbon prices, our analysis only reflects changes that could be expected by 2015. We use 
estimated short-run demand elasticities and do not assume large changes in capital stock 
in response to the carbon policy. In the long run consumers and investors would have the 
opportunity to make greater changes in response to price changes. 
                                                 
2 West (2004) also calculates consumer surplus changes in an analysis of taxes on vehicles and miles 
traveled.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
  6
We do not account for ancillary effects from changes in employment and income. 
Climate policy will likely shift economic activity away from relatively energy-intensive 
sectors of the economy to those that are less energy-intensive. This shift could lead to 
unemployment for displaced workers and may force some workers to accept jobs with 
lower wages. To the extent that lower-wage workers are employed by energy-intensive 
industries or in regions of the country that would experience a reduction in economic 
activity, these employment and income impacts could be regressive. 
It is also worth mentioning that like almost every other study in the literature, we 
are focusing only on the costs of climate policy and not the benefits. Parry et al. (2007), 
in a review of studies of the incidence of pollution control policies, found only two 
studies that had integrated benefits and costs to look at the net incidence of policies, 
Gianessi et al. (1975) and Dorfman (1977). None of the recent studies have attempted to 
take on such an analysis. For climate policies, it would be extremely difficult as one 
would need an estimate of the benefits of carbon emissions reductions.  
3  The Literature on Distributional Impacts of Climate Policies 
A number of studies of the incidence of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade policies 
have been published in recent years.3  Dinan and Rogers (2002) analyze the efficiency 
and distributional impacts of a cap-and-trade program. They incorporate behavioral 
responses (assumed uniform across households) and indexing of transfer payments (e.g., 
social security), and they allocate to households additional burdens from the effect of 
higher product prices on real factor returns and compounding efficiency costs of 
preexisting factor tax distortions (e.g., Goulder et al. 1999). They find that distributional 
effects hinge crucially on whether allowances are grandfathered or auctioned and whether 
revenues from allowance auctions, or from indirect taxation of allowance rents, are used 
to cut payroll taxes, corporate taxes, or provide lump sum transfers. For example, they 
estimate that households in the lowest-income quintile would be worse off by around 
$500 per year under grandfathered allowances; if instead the allowances were auctioned 
with revenues returned in equal lump sum rebates for all households, low-income 
households would on net be better off by around $300.  
Dinan and Rogers (2002) also highlight the trade-offs between efficiency and 
distributional concerns. They find that programs that auction allowances and reduce 
                                                 
3 We focus here only on studies that look at carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems. See Parry et al. (2007) 
for a review of the broader literature on the incidence of environmental policies. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
  7
corporate income taxes have the greatest potential for efficiency gains, while programs 
that implement lump sum revenue recycling would realize little to no increase in 
economic efficiency.  
Several studies look at carbon taxes and other kinds of energy taxes. Bull et al. 
(1994) use input–output tables to trace through the indirect component of energy taxes. 
They compare a tax based on energy content, that is, a Btu tax, and a tax based on carbon 
content. They assess the incidence of these taxes on the basis of annual income, annual 
consumption expenditures, and a measure of lifetime income that they construct by using 
data on age and education. Their results suggest that the direct components of Btu and 
carbon taxes look quite regressive on an annual income basis, while the indirect 
components are less regressive. On the basis of lifetime income, the direct component 
remains regressive, but the indirect component becomes mildly progressive; overall, the 
taxes look much less regressive on a lifetime income basis than on an annual income 
basis. This finding is consistent with studies of other kinds of taxes (Lyon and Schwab 
1995).  
Metcalf (1999), using similar data, analyzes a revenue-neutral package of 
environmental taxes, including a carbon tax, an increase in motor fuel taxes, taxes on 
various stationary source emissions, and a virgin materials tax. Prices of energy—
electricity, natural gas, fuel oil, and gasoline—increase substantially under these 
measures while prices of all other consumer goods increase by less than 5 percent. 
Although the taxes disproportionately hit low-income groups, Metcalf shows that the 
overall package can be made distributionally neutral (under a range of different income 
measures) through careful targeting of income and payroll tax reductions. 
Parry (2004) estimates a simple, calibrated, analytical model with household 
income proxied by consumption to examine the incidence of emissions allowances, 
among other control instruments, to control power plant emissions of carbon, sulfur 
dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen oxide (NOx). He finds that using grandfathered emissions 
allowances to reduce carbon emissions by 10 percent and NOx emissions by 30 percent 
can be highly regressive; the top income quintile is made better off while the bottom 
income quintile is made much worse off. The SO2 cap imposed by the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990, which has reduced emissions by roughly 45 percent, is also 
regressive but much less so than the carbon and NOx policies.  
A recent study adopts the methodology of Bull et al. (1993) and Metcalf (1999)—
that is, the use of input–output tables to calculate the indirect effect of the tax and the Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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construction of a measure of lifetime income based on age and education—and analyzes 
the effects of a carbon tax (Hassett et al. 2007). The authors also add a regional focus. 
They use CEX data for 1987, 1997, and 2003 and assess the impacts of the tax if it were 
enacted in each of those years. Similar to the earlier studies, they find that the direct 
component of the tax is significantly more regressive than the indirect component and 
that the regressivity is muted when lifetime income is used rather than annual income. 
The authors find only small differences in the incidence of the tax across regions. They 
do not, however, look at the distribution of costs across income deciles within regions.4 
Finally, Holak et al. (2008) assess the overall impacts of three recent carbon tax 
bills introduced in the U.S. Congress. As part of their study, the authors calculate the tax 
expenditures as a fraction of income and report the results by annual income decile under 
the assumption that revenues are returned in a lump sum manner. They look at three 
scenarios: one in which the burden of the tax is fully passed forward to consumers in the 
form of higher energy and product prices and two scenarios in which a share of the 
burden is borne by producers, that is, shareholders of firms.5  The tax alone, assuming 
full forward shifting, is highly regressive, but returning revenues lump sum makes it 
progressive; households in deciles 1 through 6 are actually better off with the policy, 
while only the two highest-income deciles experience a net loss. Shifting the burden back 
to shareholders also reduces the regressivity of the tax, as shareholders are predominantly 
in the higher-income groups. 
In summary, the literature indicates that it is important to look at both the direct 
effects of climate policies—that is, the direct increase in the price of energy consumed by 
households—and the indirect effects—that is, the increase in the costs of products and 
services for which energy is an input. The two effects have different impacts on 
regressivity. Studies also find that the way in which revenues from a carbon tax or 
auctioned allowances are returned to households is critically important in determining the 
incidence of the policy. Although one study finds little difference in impacts on the mean 
household across regions, we provide a more detailed regional analysis that accounts for 
the income distribution across regions. We also develop a more careful representation of 
                                                 
4 Batz et al. (2007) find differences in the regional impact of climate policy to be an important 
consideration, but they do not look at income differences. They consider only direct energy use and use 
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the electricity sector and the new transportation policy, which have regional implications. 
Also, given the importance of revenue redistribution to the overall incidence measures 
and the wide range of suggestions in the policy arena for exactly what to do with 
revenues, we look at 10 alternative scenarios for redistributing revenues and reducing the 
impacts of carbon pricing. We find these extensions have regional and distributional 
consequences that are likely to be important because political issues loom large when 
there are substantial impacts on particular states and regions. 
4  Data and Methodology  
Our estimation of the effect of climate policy on household expenditures depends 
on the emissions intensity of economic activity. The component related to direct energy 
use is relatively easy to measure; the indirect component is measured with significantly 
less precision. 
4.1  Estimating the CO2 Content of Direct Energy Expenditures  
The building blocks for the analysis are expenditures at the household level as 
reported in the CEX for 2004–2006. We use this data to anticipate the incidence of 
climate policy in the year 2015, with attention to variation across 11 regions and 10 
income levels. A variety of technological, economic, and demographic changes can be 
expected by 2015. However, we account for changes only in the transportation and 
electricity sectors. Transportation-related changes are expected to result from new 
corporate average fuel efficiency (CAFE) standards that are likely to take effect on the 
basis of recent legislation and proposed regulations. We also account for changes in 
equilibria in electricity markets, including incremental but important changes in 
investment in supply and demand technologies that occur in both the baseline and under 
climate policy by 2015. Beyond these changes, we assume that expenditure and income 
patterns in 2004–2006 are a proxy for the patterns that would be in effect in 2015 without 
climate policy.  
The population sampled in the survey includes 97,519 observations for 39,839 
households; an observation equals one household in one quarter (Table 1).6 The Bureau 
                                                 
6 These numbers exclude observations in Hawaii and Alaska. Although households can remain in the data 
for up to four quarters, each quarter’s sample is designed to be independently representative. Analysis has 
shown that richer, older, homeowning households are disproportianately likely to complete all four quarters 
of the survey. For both of these reasons, we treat each individual quarter as an observation, which we 
annualize, as opposed to only taking observations that contain four quarters’ worth of data. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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of Labor Statistics (BLS) builds a national sample, and we use their data to construct 
national after-tax income deciles, also shown in Table 1.7 Since we are interested in a 
finer level of geographic detail, we examine the data with state-level indicators. Because 
the BLS cannot preserve the confidentiality of its respondents when samples get small, 
15,486 observations (6,605) households have missing state identifiers. This top-coding 
causes five states to fall out of the data entirely. Consequently, for the regional 
component of our analysis, we have 82,033 observations for 33,234 households in 43 
states plus the District of Columbia. We aggregate the observations into 11 regions.8 
Observations with missing state identifiers are still used in our calculations at the national 
level.  
                                                 
7 We distribute regional observations based on the CEX data into these national income deciles. It is 
important to keep in mind that these income “buckets” do not necessarily accurately represent regional 
income deciles; rather, they are constructed as deciles at the national level. 
8 BLS refers to observations as “consumer units,” which we loosely interpret as households. The five 
missing states are Iowa, New Mexico, North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. Compared with the 
population as a whole, the missing observations are unevenly distributed toward the lower end of the 
income distribution.  Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Table 1. Observations by Region and After-Tax Income Decile 
Decile
Region States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
Southeast AL, AR, DC, GA, LA, 
MS, NC, SC, TN, VA
1327 1423 1434 1354 1371 1189 1230 1156 1315 1189 12988
CNV CA, NV 627 878 897 1005 1035 1111 1102 1134 1292 1567 10648
TX TX 462 501 602 617 631 624 541 608 520 594 5700
FL FL 438 578 571 611 536 634 546 568 469 401 5352
Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MS, OH, 
WV, WI
1247 1476 1764 1716 1567 1722 1754 1805 1814 1644 16509
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 593 840 961 966 926 889 1069 1061 1052 1268 9625
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 261 312 387 314 350 464 389 476 579 579 4111
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 454 443 469 534 587 584 697 591 573 590 5522
NY NY 405 443 345 391 444 407 456 465 531 599 4486
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 218 254 304 346 319 398 401 439 327 368 3374
Mountains AZ, CO 300 348 384 409 443 376 355 371 385 347 3718
National 9751 9752 9752 9752 9752 9752 9752 9752 9752 9752 97519Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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The data for some expenditure categories appear missing or are reported as zero 
for a few households. Most problematic are reported zeros for electricity expenditures 
because while it is feasible that households do not pay a separate bill, in those cases they 
inevitably receive services bundled with their housing. Therefore our estimates may 
underestimate electricity expenditure. On the other hand, zero expenditure for gasoline 
for personal transportation is plausible, but also could reflect errors in data. We interpret 
the data as a conservative (lower bound) estimate of energy use and associated CO2 
emissions in these categories.  
As noted above, the transportation sector is given special consideration because of 
the new CAFE standards proposed by the Department of Transportation’s National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration in April 2008 in response to the Energy Security 
and Independence Act passed in December 2007. These standards would bring the fuel 
economy standard for cars to 35.7 miles per gallon (mpg) and trucks to 28.6 mpg by the 
2015 model year (Table 2).  
Table 2. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Proposed  
CAFÉ Standards  
Model Year  Cars, mpg  Trucks, mpg 
2011 31.2  25.0 
2012 32.8  26.4 
2013 34.0  27.8 
2014 34.8  28.2 
2015 35.7  28.6 
 
The new regulations affect our baseline 2015 expenditure calculations in two 
ways. First, new vehicles are more costly than they would otherwise be and more costly 
than what is reflected in the 2006 CEX data, all else equal. Second, gasoline 
expenditures, all else equal, are lower than they would be without the new standards (and 
lower than 2006). Since vehicles are a durable good, new, more fuel-efficient vehicles 
only gradually replace older, less efficient ones. We briefly describe our assumptions 
about how the stock turns over and how the new regulations affect our expenditure 
calculations. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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More expensive vehicles. According to data from the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics, the percentage of new car sales out of total registered cars in a given year is 5.7 
percent, and the percentage of new trucks is 7.6 percent.9 We use these figures to 
gradually increase the proportion of vehicles on the road that meet the new standards and 
we rely on estimates in Fischer et al. (2007) to obtain our higher vehicle price for those 
new vehicle purchases.10  A new car in 2015, meeting the 35.7 mpg standard, will cost 
$149 more than it would in 2006, all else equal; a new truck will cost $246 more. In order 
to account for these cost increases, we have increased new vehicle costs by this amount in 
the base case.  
Lower gasoline consumption. The gradual vehicle turnover leads to improvements 
in on-road fleetwide average fuel efficiency. We estimate that in 2015, the average fuel 
efficiency of cars on the road will be 26.3 mpg, while the average for trucks will be 21.9 
mpg. These are improvements of 17 percent and 22 percent, respectively, over the 
fleetwide average for cars and trucks in 2006.11   
Although the higher average fuel economy for vehicles on the road reduces 
gasoline consumption, consumption does not fall in lock-step with the rise in miles per 
gallon because of what is known as the “rebound effect.” When fuel economy increases, 
the cost per mile of driving falls and in response, people drive more. The net change in 
gasoline consumption thus equals fuel savings on current mileage from a unit reduction 
in miles per gallon, less the extra fuel consumption from the increase in vehicle miles 
traveled. Based on recent estimates, we assume this rebound effect is 10 percent–that is, a 
1 percent decrease in the cost per mile of driving leads to a 10 percent increase in 
gasoline consumption (Small and Van Dender 2007; U.S. Department of Transportation 
2008). As a result, assuming the implementation of the new CAFE standards, gradual 
turnover in the vehicle stock, and the 10 percent rebound effect, average gasoline 
expenditures per household in 2015 are estimated to be 15 percent lower than the 2006 
levels.  
                                                 
9 These are the figures for 2005, the most recently available data. See 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/. The rate of replacement for new car and 
truck sales could also be affected by CAFE standards and the rising price of fuel that is not the result of 
carbon policy. 
10 Fischer et al. (2007) rely on the National Academy of Sciences’ (2002) study of fuel economy 
technologies for their estimates of the costs of meeting higher CAFE requirements. 
11 On-road average fuel efficiency is available from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. See 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Figure 1 illustrates the direct annual expenditures as a percentage of reported 
annual income by expenditure category at the national level. The 10 vertical bars 
represent income deciles, and the amount of expenditure in various categories, as a 
percentage of income, is displayed for the average household within each decile. The four 
reported categories represent direct purchase by the average household of electricity, 
gasoline, natural gas, and heating oil. Consumption of each leads directly to CO2 
emissions and climate policy would directly increase their cost.  
At the national level, direct expenditure on energy represents 25.5 percent of 
annual income among the households in the lowest-income category, which is the 
greatest percentage of any group. For the highest-income households it is 3.6 percent. On 
average across all income groups the share of expenditure on energy is 6.7 percent of 
annual income. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Figure 2. Average Household Expenditures by Region on Direct Fuel Purchases 





































The nation is divided into 11 regions in our analysis. Figure 2 shows the average 
direct energy expenditures as a percentage of income in each region and for each fuel 
type. The average expenditure ranges from a low of 5.8 percent in California and Nevada 
and the Northwest to a high of 7.5 percent in Texas. In dollars, average annual 
expenditures range from $3,547 in the Northwest to $4,676 in the Northeast.  
These overall average direct expenditures do not show a great deal of variation 
across regions. This is consistent with the findings in Hassett et al. (2007). However, Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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when one looks at the distribution across income deciles for each region, some larger 
differences show up. As we stated above, the lowest decile has average direct 
expenditures equal to 25.5 percent of income. This figure ranges from 22 percent in 
California and Nevada to 38.0 percent in the Northeast states, a difference of almost 14 
percent. The ratio of expenditures as a fraction of income for the lowest decile to that for 
the highest is 11.5 in the Southeast—i.e., households in the lowest decile pay 11.5 times 
as much as those in the highest decile, as a percentage of income. In California and 
Nevada, the comparable figure is 7.7. These findings presage some of our policy scenario 
results in the next section of the paper. 
The categories of expenditure also vary considerably across regions. Since the 
CO2 content of each type of expenditure varies, there would be variable effects on overall 
expenditures across regions. In the Northeast and the Midatlantic area, home heating 
contributes importantly to expenditures, but not so in the South. In contrast, electricity 
expenditures are substantially greater as a percentage of income in the South than for 
other regions on average. Gasoline expenditures are also greatest in the South. The 
Midwest represents a sort of transition, with intermediate levels of expenditures in all 
categories. New York would also achieve levels as high as the other regions except for 
lower gasoline expenditures. In the West, overall expenditure tends to be lower, but 
gasoline expenditure is relatively high, especially compared with the Northeast. These 
variations are amplified when comparing regional differences for the lowest income 
groups. 
To understand how household expenditures would be affected by climate policy, 
we calculate the quantities of fuels purchased by households in each group by taking 
expenditures from BLS and dividing by fuel-specific, state-specific energy prices from 
the Energy Information Administration (EIA). With information about the quantities of 
fuels purchased, we can calculate the embodied CO2 content of expenditures and the 
incremental change in expenditures that would result from a price on CO2 emissions. For 
natural gas, fuel oil, and gasoline, the carbon content and resulting CO2 emissions are 
fixed numbers. For electricity, the CO2 content varies depending on the fuel used for 
generation over seasonal and diurnal periods in different regions. This pattern is 
identified from the Haiku electricity market model built and maintained by Resources for 
the Future.12  
                                                 
12 Haiku models regions with either regulated (cost-of-service) or market-based prices (see Paul et al. 2008 
for a description of the model). Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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4.2  Estimating the Indirect CO2 Content of Other Expenditures 
The second category we incorporate in the analysis is spending on energy 
embodied indirectly in goods and services, the most important of which are food, durable 
goods, and services. CO2 emissions resulting from indirect energy consumption are 
calculated on the basis of data in Hassett et al. (2007), who provide information on the 
emissions intensity of goods aggregated into 38 indirect expenditure categories by 
updating methods developed in Metcalf (1999).13  
The estimates of direct fuel use and the implied CO2 emissions based on the CEX 
data correspond well to data collected by EIA (2007), as do those of Batz et al. (2007). 
However, the total emissions we calculate fall short of economywide EIA estimates. Our 
analysis of the CEX data accounts for per capita emissions of 16.9 metric tons CO2 
(mtCO2), where information from EIA indicates per capita emissions of 20.2 mtCO2.14 
Batz et al. (2007) mention several potential explanations for discrepancies between CEX 
data and other sources, including oversampling of urban areas in the CEX data. Another 
discrepancy is nonfossil fuel sources of CO2, including cement and limestone, which 
account for nearly 2 percent in the EIA data but are missing from CEX data because 
input–output tables would not account for process emissions. Other possible sources of 
discrepancy are the estimate of the CO2 content of goods and services or errors in 
mapping CEX data into expenditure categories. Finally, it is possible that this 
discrepancy could reflect emissions from exports, which would show up in production 
data but not consumption data. However, the production data also would not account for 
emissions associated with the production of goods imported to the United States.  
The literature reveals a variety of approaches to deal with inconsistency between 
the CEX data and other sources. Batz et al. (2007) correct for oversampling in their 
demographic model. Dinan and Rogers (2002) scale the CEX data so they align with 
expenditures reported in the National Income Product Accounts, which implicitly scales 
emissions from fossil fuel use at the national level. Boyce and Riddle (2007) do not scale 
and appear to account for only 13.46 mtCO2 per capita in their data. On the other hand, 
Hassett et al. (2007) appear to account for emissions of 24.4 mtCO2 per capita, well 
above the EIA estimate.  
                                                 
13 Hassett et al. (2007) provide information on the change in product price assuming no behavioral 
adjustments in response to a tax of $15 per mtCO2. Dividing these price changes by 15 yields the implied 
CO2 content per dollar spent in each category. Metcalf (1999) has been the basis for similar calculations 
elsewhere in the literature (Dinan and Rogers 2002; Boyce and Riddle 2007). 
14 The estimate is based on the U.S. population in 2006.  Resources for the Future      Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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To measure the effects on households in a way that more closely resembles the 
EIA data, we scale the emissions intensity of nonfuel expenditures in the CEX data so 
that the total emissions correspond with EIA estimates. Therefore we only scale the 
emissions intensity of the indirect expenditure category, increasing it by 47 percent (3.31 
mtCO2 per capita) to achieve overall EIA emissions levels.  
The left side of Figure 3 reflects data and assumptions used in our analysis built 
on the CEX data. The upper left reports our estimate of 20.2 mtCO2 per capita after 
scaling indirect expenditures. The upper boxes indicate our accounting for emissions in 
the baseline (no climate policy). The analysis of household expenditures on the left side 
of the figure includes percentages of emissions attributed to four categories of economic 
activity: personal transportation (t*), emissions from consumption of other goods and 
services after scaling so that total emissions match EIA (indirect), home heating with 
natural gas and fuel oil (h), and residential electricity. We discuss the elasticities and the 
benchmark policy results in Section 5 below.  
The right side of Figure 3 displays information about economywide emissions and 
the percentage of per capita emissions that are attributable to all transportation (T*), other 
sources (Other), and all electricity (Elec), according to EIA (2007). After adjusting for 
CAFE increases that will take effect by 2015 the emissions per capita fall from 20.2 to 
19.52 mtCO2. We interpret this information as our baseline (no climate policy) average 
emissions per capita scenario for 2015. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
  20
Figure 4. Emissions (mtCO2) per Capita by Alternative Measures 
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Figure 4 (panel A) illustrates the CO2 content of expenditures for direct and 
indirect fuel purchases for the average household in each income group at the national 
level. The expenditures for direct fuel purchases are distributed fairly evenly across 
income groups. The big difference emerges in the indirect expenditure category where 
high income households spend significantly more than low income households. We 
assume the emissions intensity per dollar of expenditure for indirect consumption of fuels 
is uniform throughout the country; consequently, actual emissions vary directly with 
expenditure. However, panel B in Figure 4 shows that there are significant differences 
across regions in the types of direct expenditures for fuels. The variation in emissions 
from the electricity sector is particularly noteworthy.  
5  Effects of Pricing CO2  
Figure 5 illustrates the mechanism of a placing a price on CO2 emissions through 
the introduction of a cap-and-trade policy. The horizontal axis in the graph is the 
reduction in emissions (moving to the right implies lower emissions), and the upward 
sloping curve is the incremental resource cost of a schedule of measures to reduce 
emissions; thus it sketches out the marginal abatement cost curve. The hypothetical 
emissions cap in the figure is set at about 75 percent of baseline emissions. According to 
most experts, for the next couple of decades at least, the value of emissions allowances 
under a cap-and-trade program should be substantially larger than the value of the 
resources actually used to achieve emissions reductions. This relationship is illustrated in 
the stylized graph, where the allowance value rectangle—the height of the rectangle 
equals the allowance price and the width is the number of emissions allowances—is 
much larger than the triangle-shaped abatement costs. Moreover, the value of the 
allowances (the rectangle) grows faster than the cost of emissions reductions (the 
triangle) as the emissions cap is tightened until reductions of about one-third are reached. 
These facts highlight the important role played by the allocation of emissions allowances 
in determining the regressivity of climate policy under an incentive-based policy such as 
cap-and-trade or a carbon tax. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Figure 5. Resource Cost and Allowance Value in a CO2 Cap-and-Trade Program 
 
An emissions cap-and-trade program (or equivalently an emissions tax) serves as 
a central policy case to provide a benchmark for our comparison of policies. We 
benchmark the stringency to an emissions reduction of 3.13 mtCO2 per capita, including 
the CAFE adjustment, resulting from a price of $41.50 (in 2006 dollars) per ton of CO2.15 
We assume the policy is announced in 2008 and takes effect in 2012, and we consider the 
effect on households in 2015. This time frame allows for some technological evolution in 
transportation and electricity; otherwise, expenditure patterns of households are assumed 
to match those in the CEX data. In evaluating alternative policies that could be pursued to 
address distributional effects we scale the CO2 price in order to hold per capita emissions 
constant so that these alternatives can be compared with the benchmark climate policy in 
an emissions-neutral manner.  
To calculate the change in emissions we multiply the CO2 price by the CO2 
content of expenditures in each category except electricity and add this to the product 
                                                 
15 This price reflects a marginal cost approximately three times greater than what would have been 
expected from the McCain–Lieberman proposal (S.280) and is roughly equal to the price of emissions 
allowances in the E.U. Emissions Trading Scheme for the second trading period (2008–2012), which were 
trading at about $40 per mtCO2 in 2008. The irregular price number results from converting units and the 
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price to calculate new levels of expenditure. Although demand is relatively inelastic in 
the short run, the change in product prices is expected to lead to a change in consumer 
expenditures, which we calculate using elasticity estimates specific to each fuel. As 
reported in the left side of Figure 3, we use short-run elasticity ( ) ε  for gasoline of –0.1 
taken from Hughes et al. (2008). For indirect expenditures, we use several short-run 
elasticities take from Boyce and Riddle (2007) that range from –0.25 to –1.3.16 For 
natural gas we use –0.2 taken from Dahl (1993); we also use this elasticity for fuel oil. To 
model the change in residential electricity demand we use the Haiku model, which solves 
for equilibria including changes in investment in generation capacity, electricity price, 
and demand at the regional level. The change in carbon emissions (mtCO2) for residential 
customers in the electricity sector for a $1.00 change in the carbon price is  0.13
e Θ= − . 
These estimates allow us to calculate the new quantity of consumption, which can be 
multiplied by the new price to find the new level of expenditures. The net effect of these 
changes in expenditures is an emissions level of 17.06 mtCO2 per capita. With an eye on 
changes that would be likely to occur by 2015, the use of short-run elasticities is probably 
appropriate; however, it may underrepresent the behavioral changes that would occur 
under climate policy as more adjustments could be made in the seven-year time period.  
This approach implicitly assumes all changes in costs are fully passed through to 
consumers in every industry except electricity, which we model in greater detail. In the 
long run, production technology is usually characterized as constant returns to scale, 
which implies that consumers bear the cost of policy. In the short run there is more likely 
to be a sharing of lost economic surplus with producers because of changes in the value 
of in-place capital, but this will dissipate over time. The electricity sector is an exception 
because of the long-lived nature of capital in the sector, which means that the loss to 
producers will dissipate more slowly. Nonetheless, even in this sector consumers are 
expected to bear eight times the cost born by producers.17  The degree to which the 
burden of any tax is shared between consumers and producers has been the focus of 
previous studies but is outside our scope here. As explained in the literature review 
above, Holak (2008) assesses the distributional impacts of a carbon tax under alternative 
assumptions about the share of burden borne by consumers and producers. 
                                                 
16 These indirect elasticities are –0.6 for food; –1.3 for industrial goods; –1 for services; and –0.25 for air 
and other transport.  
17 Burtraw and Palmer (2008). Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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5.1  How to Interpret Incidence and Alternative Policy Remedies  
The $41.50 CO2 price that we model in the benchmark policy case is expected to 
yield a reduction of 16 percent in CO2 emissions per capita according to our model of 
household expenditures. Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of costs over income groups 
at the national level after accounting for changes in expenditures. To understand the 
numbers in Figure 6, consider an average family in the fifth decile. If one were to ignore 
the change in consumption that would be expected, as has been done in much of the 
previous literature, then the introduction of the CO2 price would cause expenditures for 
direct energy use to increase by $807 (1.9 percent) and total expenditures to increase by 
$1,711 (4.1 percent). However, after accounting for changes in consumption behavior in 
response to the higher prices, this family would experience an increase in expenditures of 
only $868 (2.1 percent), which is indicated by the smaller bar in the figure. This does not 
account for the revenue from allowances; it is simply an illustration of how expenditures 
for direct fuel use and for consumption of goods and services with indirect emissions 
would change if the prices were to reflect the price of allowances, accounting for 
behavioral responses in each market as described previously. The figure illustrates that 
the changes as a percentage of income appear the greatest for low-income households 
because they spend proportionately more on energy-related expenditures. 
Figure 6. Expenditures and Consumer Surplus Loss as Fraction of Income  
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The change in expenditure can differ importantly from the change in consumer 
surplus. To illustrate the differences between the two measures, imagine an expenditure 
category with own-price elasticity of demand equal to –1. In this case, an increase in 
price would lead to a reduction in quantity but there would be no change in expenditure. 
Simply equating expenditure change with well-being therefore would underestimate the 
cost of constraining carbon; all other things equal, consumers are clearly harmed if they 
are forced to consume less. The larger quantities in the bar graph in Figure 6 indicate the 
changes in consumer surplus as a percentage of income; the change in consumer surplus 
is always larger than the change in expenditure. Positive values indicate the absolute 
value of the magnitude of the loss. Again, the greatest changes (loss in consumer surplus) 
as a percentage of income occur for low-income households. 18 
One way to represent the distribution of costs in a quantitative manner is the Suits 
Index, which is the tax analog to the better-known Gini coefficient that serves as an index 
measuring income inequality. A curve is constructed by plotting the relationship between 
cumulative tax paid and cumulative income earned.19 The area under this curve is then 
compared with the area under a proportional line to calculate the Suits Index. If all tax 
collections are nonnegative, the index is bounded by –1 and 1, with values less than zero 
connoting regressivity and values greater than zero connoting progressivity; a 
proportional tax has a Suits Index of zero (Suits 1977). The Suits Index provides a simple 
metric with which to compare the distributional impacts of alternative policies. We 
modify the standard interpretation to measure the incidence on households according to 
their loss in consumer surplus rather than taxes paid. Second, we allow for negative tax 
payments and other forms of subsidies, so our modified Suits Index (MSI) is not bounded 
by –1 and 1. At the national level, not accounting for the revenue that may be collected or 
the allocation of emissions allowances, the MSI value for the CO2 price of $41.50 is 
-0.18. 
                                                 
18  West (2004) showed that when demand elasticities vary by income group, using consumer surplus 
rather than expenditures can lead to quite different distributional findings. She estimates a more elastic 
demand for gasoline (and miles traveled) in lower-income groups than higher ones, leading those groups to 
reduce gasoline expenditures more in response to a gasoline tax (and other vehicle-related taxes). This 
behavioral adjustment will mute the regressivity of the tax when regressivity is measured on the basis of 
expenditures. However, the consumer surplus effect, because it adds a welfare loss triangle to the 
expenditure rectangle, indicates a greater harm to lower-income households. Although we calculate a 
consumer surplus effect, we do not allow elasticities to vary by income. 
19 This curve is similar to a Lorenz curve, which graphically represents the cumulative distribution of 
income relative to the cumulative distribution of the population.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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The impact of the policy on household direct energy expenditures differs across 
regions, as evident in Figure 2, and we also find differences with respect to changes in 
expenditure on goods and services that are affected by the CO2 price. Hassett et al. (2007) 
conduct a comparison of the regional incidence of a carbon tax, finding it “quite 
remarkable how small” the differences are across regions. Batz et al. (2007) reach a 
different conclusion. Although they only look at direct energy use, they do so with much 
greater geographic detail than previous efforts by looking at data at the county level, and 
they look at differences in the emissions intensity of electricity generation across the 
country. They find “substantial variation in the incidence of a carbon emissions tax” 
across regions, which they explain as due to variation in energy use as well as differences 
in the carbon intensity of electricity generation. Our analysis does not have the detail at 
the county level, but it does have similar estimates of electricity generation by using an 
updated version of the model they use, and it includes indirect expenditures. These 
analyses do not look at the allocation of CO2 revenue. 
The $41.50 CO2 price raises significant revenue that must be accounted for in 
some manner. We assume the first claimant for the revenue is government, which is 
subject to a budget constraint. The government budget is affected in at least three ways 
(Dinan and Rogers 2002). One is that government’s energy-related expenses would 
increase under climate policy. Second, if the policy leads to a reduction in overall 
spending, government would see a decline in revenues from taxation. Third, the 
government could see an increase in the cost of social programs if the economy slows 
down as a consequence of the policy or if lower-income households are severely affected. 
Finally, we assume there will be an increase in government expenditures to fund climate-
related research. To maintain the government’s budget constraint (at the federal and state 
level combined), throughout the following analysis we assume that 35 percent of the 
revenue collected is immediately directed to the government, leaving 65 percent of the 
revenue for other purposes.20 In some cases the climate policy could lead to additional 
sources of government revenue such as taxes collected on extra dividends that result if 
free allocation of allowances were given to emitters. In the policy scenarios that follow, 
we net out this effect so that the government retains a constant 35 percent share of 
revenue in each scenario.  
                                                 
20 Dinan and Rogers (2002) estimate that the government would need about 23 percent of the allowance 
value to offset its higher costs stemming from its own consumption of allowances, adjustments to higher 
energy prices, higher transfer income payments, lower revenues, and automatic indexing of individual tax 
collections. We round up to 35 percent to provide for increased government expenditure on research and 
development and other measures to address climate change. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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6  Results for Alternative Policy Scenarios 
The price on CO2 emissions creates a sum of revenue of significant value. The 
way this value is allocated to different groups in the economy greatly affects the costs 
and distributional burden of the carbon policy. Evaluating alternative approaches to the 
distribution of the CO2 revenue provides important information to policymakers trying to 
design an efficient and fair policy. We group our revenue scenarios into (1) cap-and-
dividend options, (2) changes to preexisting taxes, (3) energy and fuel sector adjustments, 
and as a comparison, (4) a scenario with free allocation to incumbent emitters.  
Some of the approaches we analyze have “leftover” revenue because of the level 
at which we set the remedy or the type of remedy. When this is the case, we assume the 
leftover revenue is distributed in the same manner as cap-and-dividend, that is, in a lump 
sum manner to each person, so all approaches can be directly compared. In all cases, we 
assume the government captures the first 35 percent of CO2 revenue. 
6.1  Cap-and-Dividend (Lump Sum Transfers) 
One straight-forward remedy to alleviate the regressivity of the carbon policy 
would be to return the CO2 revenue to households on a per capita basis. This approach 
recently has been referred to as “cap-and-dividend” (Boyce and Riddle 2007) and 
previously was known as “sky trust” (Kopp et al. 1999; Barnes 2001). In principle, the 
government would auction the emissions allowances and return the auction revenues in a 
lump sum manner to each person. Using information from the CEX, we identify the 
number of persons per household in each income group in each region and calculate a per 
capita dividend payment to redistribute to each household. In our first scenario, people 
are assumed to pay personal income taxes on the dividends. In the next scenario, 
discussed in section 6.1.ii below, we consider a dividend that is not taxed. 21   
6.1.1  Taxed Dividends   
The net effect of the first cap-and-dividend policy, by region and nationally, is 
shown in Figure 7. The bar graph illustrates the incidence of the policy, in consumer 
surplus loss, on the average household in each income group; the table portion of the 
                                                 
21 Since our results are derived in a partial equilibrium setting, we do not consider any effects that this 
lump sum payment would have on household expenditures. However, recent evidence from the behavioural 
economics literature suggests that consumers are unlikely to factor the expectation of such payments into 
their shortrun energy consumption decisions (Sunstein and Thaler 2008).  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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figure shows the impacts for the average household in each region and for the households 
in the lowest two income deciles. The MSI and the carbon allowance price are also listed.  
Figure 7. Cap-and-Dividend (Taxable) 
 
The bar with darker shading and the greatest vertical height represents the loss in 
consumer surplus as a share of after tax income. (This value repeats information that was 
illustrated in Figure 6). The bar with the lighter shading represents the incidence of the 
policy after distributing the value of allowances as a per capita dividend. The first finding 
that is obvious from the graph is the fact that households in the lowest deciles see a 
dramatic improvement in their well-being as a result of the lump sum dividend of 
allowance revenues. The average household in decile 1 incurs a consumer surplus loss 
slightly greater than 10 percent of its income without the dividend but gets a consumer 
surplus gain equal to 3.8 percent of income with the dividend.  
The second interesting result is that the dividend equalizes the net burden across 
income groups. The net consumer surplus loss as a percentage of income across deciles 2 
through 10 ranges from approximately zero for decile 2 to only 1.68 percent for decile 9. 
These results highlight the fact that the dividend, as a percentage of income, obviously 
has a much greater impact for poorer households than for wealthier ones. The MSI 
reinforces these findings: as stated above, the MSI for the carbon pricing policy alone 
(without the redistribution of allowance revenues) is –0.18; the MSI with the (taxed) Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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lump sum redistribution of revenues is 0.15. Thus the policy goes from being regressive 
to mildly progressive. 
The table portion of Figure 7 shows the net dollar loss in consumer surplus 
(including the dividend), along with the loss as a percentage of income, for an average 
household in each region and for an average household in deciles 1 and 2. (Positive 
numbers in the table indicate a loss and negative numbers indicate a gain, consistent with 
the graph.) The important take-away message from the numbers in the table is the 
significant variation in impacts across regions for households in deciles 1 and 2. In Texas, 
these households experience a consumer surplus gain of $342, or 3.8 percent of income, 
while households in deciles 1 and 2 in the Northeast incur a loss of $151, or 1.23 percent 
of income. By contrast, the variation for the mean household across regions is relatively 
small when viewed as a percentage of income—the lowest region is the Northwest, with 
a loss equal to approximately 1 percent of income, while the highest is the Ohio Valley at 
1.78 percent.  
Figure 8. Cap-and-Dividend (Taxable) 
 
To illustrate the incidence of policy across all income groups and regions we 
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height represent the loss in consumer surplus as a share of after-tax income, and the bars 
with the lighter shading represent the net loss after distributing the value of allowances as 
a per capita dividend. The figure for the nation is replicated in the lower-left corner, and 
the region-specific figures are displayed for each of the 11 regions we model. The map 
indicates that the regional differences come into consideration for the lower-income 
groups and for the average consumers. There is relatively little variation among the 
upper-income groups across regions.  
6.1.2  Nontaxable Dividends 
It is not clear whether carbon allowance dividends in a new cap-and-trade 
program would be treated as taxable or nontaxable income. Our first scenario considered 
them as taxable, the same as most other sources of income. In other words, the 
government was assumed to collect the allowance revenue and redistribute the entire 
amount (less the 35 percent that is withheld in all our scenarios) to households that would 
then pay taxes on that money at their standard marginal rate. In this scenario, we treat the 
dividends as untaxed. This case is similar to the 2008 federal tax rebates, which were also 
untaxed. 
Figure 9. Cap-and-Dividend (Nontaxable) 
 
Figure 9 shows a bar graph of the distributional impacts of the policy at the 
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policy we analyzed, the bar graph illustrates that this policy tends to equalize the burden 
across income groups. The loss as a percentage of income across deciles 2 through 10 is 
almost constant—ranging from only 1.1 percent to 1.45 percent. The MSI is 0.05, 
indicating that the policy is progressive. Unlike the previous policy, however, none of the 
income deciles here shows a gain in consumer surplus. This happens because of the 
differences in the marginal tax rates across income groups that affected the results for the 
previous policy. When the dividend is taxed, the relative gain to the lower deciles is 
greater because of their lower marginal tax rates. In this scenario, where the dividends are 
untaxed, these differences do not play a role. 
As the table in Figure 9 shows, there is still substantial variation across regions 
for the lowest-income deciles for this policy. Again, households in the Northeast lose the 
most—$355 per year, or 3.45 percent of income for the average household in the lowest 
two deciles; by contrast, the average household in these deciles in Texas, 
California/Nevada, and the Northwest experiences a consumer surplus gain. 
The average consumer surplus loss for this policy across all households in the 
United States is $795, just slightly less than our first scenario in which dividends were 
taxed. 
6.2 Reducing  Preexisting  Taxes 
A prominent suggestion from the public finance literature is to direct revenues 
collected under federal climate policy to reduce preexisting taxes that distort behavior 
away from economic efficiency (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994; Bovenberg and Goulder 
1996; Goulder et al. 1999; Parry et al. 1999). The failure to do so can impose a hidden 
cost of climate policy that can magnify the overall cost to the economy.22 If climate 
policy is more expensive than it otherwise needs to be, then this inevitably affects 
households in all income groups. Therefore, designing policy to be as cost-effective as 
possible can be thought of as an important component of addressing the impact on low-
income households. 
                                                 
22 Theory suggests that any tax or regulatory cost causes a difference between the value of marginal 
product and opportunity cost in the affected factor markets. By raising costs, a new regulation such as 
climate policy acts like a virtual tax by lowering the real wage, which causes a reduction in the supply of 
relevant factors such as labor or capital. Moreover, a new regulatory cost exacerbates the inefficiency that 
arises from preexisting regulations and taxes, raising costs at an increasing rate. If revenue is used to reduce 
preexisting taxes, then this effect can be offset to considerable degree. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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To measure the effect of interactions with other regulations and taxes and the 
benefits of revenue recycling to offset the effect requires a general equilibrium 
framework or linked partial equilibrium models that include labor or capital supply 
decisions. Dinan and Rogers (2002) include a reduced form representation of the benefits 
of revenue recycling. We do not include the effects in factor markets in this analysis, in 
part because the exact way in which those effects accrue throughout the economy has not 
been studied previously. However, we do model the direct effect on household finances 
of using CO2 revenue to reduce the income tax, reduce the payroll tax, and augment the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), ignoring the welfare issues associated with changes in 
the supply of labor.  
6.2.1  Reducing the Income Tax 
A reduction in the income tax could be implemented in many ways. In this first 
scenario, we assume an overall reduction in tax collections in proportion to the amount 
paid by households in each income bracket.23 The highest-income groups pay the most in 
taxes because they have the highest average and marginal tax rate and the rate is applied 
to the most income. Therefore this approach benefits the highest-income groups 
disproportionately. Nonetheless, this approach follows from the underlying theory that 
changes in labor supply affect economic growth most significantly if they involve those 
individuals with the highest value of marginal product, for example, the highest wage. 
Thus this scenario is useful to analyze. 
The Congressional Budget Office (2005) reports the average tax burden of U.S. 
households by income decile. We multiply this percentage by the amount of income 
earned by each decile to get a share of total income tax burden by decile. Finally, we 
distribute carbon revenue proportional to each household’s estimated share of the total 
income tax burden. Figure 10 shows the incidence of the policy across income groups; 
again, the dark bar shows the policy before the return of revenue, and the lighter-colored 
bar shows the net effects after the allowance revenues are used to reduce income taxes. 
The accompanying table shows the regional effects. 
The bar graph illustrates that the lowest-income groups receive very little benefit 
from this approach to reducing taxes. Most of the benefit accrues to the highest-income 
                                                 
23 Another option would be to assume that future tax increases and/or benefit decreases associated with 
deficits would be evenly distributed across the population (Rogers 2007). In this case, deficit reduction 
would be progressive. A fixed per capita reduction in future tax claims is analogous to the cap-and-
dividend approach as modeled here. For this reason we do not explicitly consider this policy.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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groups, and the very highest-income group, decile 10, ends up with a net gain under this 
climate policy. An average family in decile 10 nets a consumer surplus gain of $996 per 
year, 0.56 percent of annual income. By contrast, the average family in the lowest-
income decile incurs a net cost of $694, nearly 10 percent of income. The MSI for this 
policy is –0.79, indicating that the option is strongly regressive. 
Figure 10. Reducing the Income Tax 
 
The regional impacts are less pronounced than the impacts for the previous two 
policies. Nonetheless, our findings continue to show that poor households in the Ohio 
Valley and the Northeast are affected relatively more than poor households in the 
Northwest and California/Nevada. The average household in the lowest two deciles in the 
Northeast incurs a consumer surplus loss of 9.8 percent of annual income, while the 
average household in the lowest two deciles in the Northwest incurs a loss just less than 7 
percent of income. As with many of our other policies, the regional differences are more 
pronounced for these lower-income households than they are for the mean households. 
6.2.2  Reducing the Payroll Tax 
Using carbon allowance revenues to reduce payroll taxes such as Social Security 
is another option for “greening” the tax system that some experts have suggested. In 
addition to income taxes, employers are required to withhold one-half of each employee’s 
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respectively). The employer then pays the other half; however, it is common to assume 
that this expense is passed on to employees in the form of lower wages. Together these 
two taxes, also called Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes, are applied to 
the first $90,000 in wages for each employee.24 For this policy case we modeled a 2 
percent reduction in payroll taxes. Unfortunately it is not easy to distinguish which 
member of the household earned what fraction of wage income in the BLS data.25 To 
represent households with multiple wage earners, we cap eligible wages at $135,000. 
After reducing payroll taxes paid from 15.3 percent to 13.3 percent, the scenario leads to 
some “leftover” allowance revenues—as we explained in the introduction to section 6 
above, some of our remedies do not exhaust all of the allowance revenue—thus the 
remainder is distributed in a lump sum fashion on as a taxable per capita dividend to 
everyone. The payroll deduction accounted for 16 percent of total revenue raised by the 
program, leaving 49 percent to be distributed as a per capita dividend. 
Like the income tax reduction scenario we analyzed above, the payroll tax 
deduction makes for a regressive carbon policy (even with a substantial proportion of the 
revenues distributed lump-sum). The distribution of net consumer surplus losses across 
the deciles is shown in Figure 11. The bar graph illustrates that, while the burden is 
reduced from rebating the revenues through reductions in this preexisting tax—that is, the 
light blue bars all lay below the dark blue ones—the distribution of the impacts across 
deciles remains virtually the same. Poor households are still disproportionately harmed 
by the policy. The MSI, while not as negative as for the income tax reduction, is still 
negative at -0.33. An average household in the lowest-income decile experiences a net 
consumer surplus loss of approximately $435, which is equal to 6.2 percent of income. 
The impact falls as a percentage of income as income rises; the average decile 10 
household pays only 0.7 percent of its income for the carbon policy.  
                                                 
24 The $90,000 cap was in effect in 2005, the middle of our sample period, and we use that figure in our 
analysis here. A slightly higher cap was in effect in 2006 in these deciles. 
25 Note the distinction between wages and income. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
  35
Figure 11. Reducing the Payroll Tax 
 
 
As with the income tax reduction policy, the payroll tax option does not impose 
major differences at the regional level. The Northwest is harmed relatively less and the 
Northeast relatively more, as with several of our other policies, but the range in impacts 
for the lowest two deciles is not as great as for some of our other policy options. Most of 
the story for this policy option, as with the reducing income tax option, is told at the 
national level. 
6.2.3  Expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit 
Greenstein et al. (2008) has suggested that revenues generated under a cap-and-
trade program or a carbon tax should be used to expand the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC). The EITC is available to families earning wages below a particular threshold.26 
The amount of the credit falls as income rises and is higher for families with children and 
is adjusted each year. For example, in 2007 the credit for a family with two or more 
children was equal to 40 percent of the first $11,790 of earned income; for earnings 
                                                 
26  Here it is important to note that we are distinguishing between wages and income. While the EITC does 
phase out at a given wage level, it’s possible for a family’s total income to exceed that. For this reason, we 
see some families receiving the EITC in every decile.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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beyond $15,399, the credit drops to 21 percent and falls to zero when earnings pass 
$37,782. In our policy scenario, we first estimate the current EITC for each observation 
based on the 2006 EITC parameters. We then take half of this estimate and redistribute it 
to each household, which is analogous to increasing the EITC program by 50 percent. 
The expansion of the EITC accounted for 59 percent of total revenue raised by the 
program, leaving 6 percent to be distributed as per capita dividends. 
The distributional results for our EITC expansion policy are shown in Figure 12. 
As expected, households in the lower-income deciles benefit the most from this policy. 
The average household in decile 1 experiences a net consumer surplus gain of $301, 
which is 4.3 percent of annual income, and the average household in decile 2 experiences 
a gain of $190, 1.23 percent of income. Comparing the dark and light blue bars in the 
graph indicates that the redistribution of revenues through the EITC program 
dramatically changes the regressivity of the policy. The MSI for this option is 0.23, 
compared with –0.18 for the carbon policy without the return of revenues.  
 
Figure 12. Expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit 
 
As is the case with many of our policies, households are affected differently 
depending on where they live. As the table portion of Figure 12 shows, the average 
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is second only to the Ohio Valley region on a percentage of income basis. The starkest 
regional contrast shows up for households in the lowest two deciles. While most 
households in these groups experience a gain, and the average gain for the United States 
as a whole for deciles 1 and 2 is $245, two regions see their lowest-income households 
incurring a loss. In the Northeast, the average household in the bottom two deciles loses 
$120 per year, or slightly more than 1 percent of annual income. The average household 
in the bottom two deciles in Florida also experiences a net loss. By contrast, the average 
household in Texas in the bottom two deciles earns a consumer surplus gain of $603, or 6 
percent of income. The range across regions for these deciles is $723. This is a very large 
difference for poor households across regions. 
6.3  Energy and Fuel Sector Adjustments 
Several suggestions have been made for targeting allowance revenues under a 
cap-and-trade system to the fuel and energy sectors. The justifications range from a desire 
to directly offset higher energy costs, to a sense that some of these sectors are already 
targeted by other policies, to an attempt to spur energy efficiency improvements. For 
example, it is often argued that the transportation sector should be exempt from the cap 
because most studies have shown low price elasticity of demand for vehicle miles 
traveled or for gasoline use and the introduction of a CO2 price would have a fairly small 
effect on the price of gasoline. In addition, personal motor vehicles are subject to fuel 
economy standards that have recently been tightened. Also, some have argued that home 
heating fuels should be exempt or that the federal Low-Income Home Energy Assistance 
Program (LIHEAP), which provides one-time financial assistance to low-income 
households for home heating or cooling bills, should be expanded. Others have 
recommended that allowances be given to electricity consumers to offset the relatively 
large expected increase in prices in that sector. And finally, expansion of energy 
efficiency programs usually run by electricity and gas utilities has been suggested. We 
consider each of these options with the exception of expanding LIHEAP because the 
program is operated differently in each state, making it difficult to accurately model an 
expansion in this program in our framework. Our home heating oil scenario results are 
expected to be somewhat similar to an expansion of LIHEAP. 
6.3.1  Excluding the Transportation Sector 
The transportation sector is responsible for 32.3 percent of emissions nationally, 
and the CEX data indicate that personal automobile transportation–related emissions 
from use of gasoline account for about 21 percent of total per capita emissions associated Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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with direct fuel use by households. Gasoline use is not spread equally around the nation. 
Appendix A illustrates that gasoline use in the West and Southwest is considerably higher 
than the Northeast Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 1, transportation expense is not 
distributed evenly across income groups; the largest expense as a share of income 
belongs to the lowest decile, and this share decreases as households move up the income 
ladder.  
Because the demand for gasoline is inelastic in the short run, the expected 
reduction in emissions associated with personal transportation is only 2.2 percent in 2015 
due to the imposition of a price on CO2. Many authors have suggested that policies other 
than those that raise the cost of transportation are necessary to realize important changes 
in the performance of automobiles as well as changes in personal transportation habits. 
One example is the revised CAFE standards that are assumed to be in place throughout 
all of our scenarios, helping to achieve emissions reductions compared with 2006 
emissions.. Therefore, one way to lessen the incidence of the CO2 price without 
undermining environmental goals might be to exclude the transportation sector from 
coverage. This approach would resemble the design of the E.U. Emissions Trading 
Scheme, which covers major point source emissions totaling roughly 50 percent of total 
CO2 emissions in the European Union, but which excludes the transportation sector as 
well as direct fuel use for home heating or cooling. 
Although a CO2 price in transportation may not be especially effective in 
achieving emissions reductions, exclusion of the transportation sector nonetheless erodes 
the emissions reductions that otherwise would be expected to occur in the sector from the 
imposition of a CO2 price. In order to meet the aggregate emissions goal more reductions 
have to be achieved in other sectors, thereby raising the costs in those sectors. Nationally, 
we estimate the allowance price has to rise from $41.50 per mtCO2 under an 
economywide approach to $42.83 when the transportation sector is not included, which in 
turn has implications for the incidence of costs incurred in other sectors. 
Before discussing the regional impacts and the impacts across income groups, 
however, we want to point out that the change in expenditures and the change in 
consumer surplus, before the return of allowance revenues, are both smaller in magnitude 
for the scenario in which transportation is excluded than for the basic economywide cap-
and-dividend policy. This result is attributable to the relatively inelastic demand for 
transport compared with other sectors. Applying a slightly higher CO2 price to the 
nontransport sectors including the indirect purchase of goods and services leads to less of 
an increase in expenditures and loss in consumer surplus than applying a slightly lower Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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CO2 price more broadly to all goods and services. The average consumer surplus loss 
across all households from the transport-exempt policy is $1,620 before accounting for 
the allowance revenues, which is 2.78 percent of income. By contrast, the cap-and-
dividend policy cost an average household almost $2,000, or 3.4 percent of income. But 
because the cap-and-dividend policy generates more revenue, the net consumer surplus 
loss, including return of the revenues, is smaller in the economywide cap-and-dividend 
policy than in the transport-exempt policy. In the cap-and-dividend policy the net 
consumer surplus loss is $809 for an average household (when dividends are taxed, our 
first scenario analyzed above), while it is $832 in the transport-exempt scenario. This 
number is shown in the last row of the table in Figure 13, which also shows the regional 
impacts. Figure 13 includes, as well, the bar graph illustrating gross and net consumer 
surplus loss for the average household in each income decile. 
Figure 13. Excluding Transportation 
 
As the bar graph shows, excluding the transportation sector still leaves the lower-
income groups incurring a larger consumer surplus loss as a percentage of income than 
the higher groups (the dark blue bars). It is only when the revenue is returned in a lump 
sum fashion that this regressivity is reduced (the light blue bars). At the national level, 
the MSI is 0.06 when transportation is excluded. This suggests that the policy is 
progressive, though less so than the cap-and-(taxed) dividend policy, which had an MSI 
of 0.15.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
  40
However, once again, the regional effects differ substantially for the different 
income groups. The table in Figure 13 illustrates this result. An average U.S. household 
incurs a net consumer surplus loss of $832, or 1.43 percent of annual income, but this 
figure varies from $649 in the Northwest to $1,152 in the Northeast. The difference in 
costs for low-income households across regions is more pronounced, varying from a loss 
of nearly $300 in the Northeast to a gain of $143 in Texas. As a percentage of income, 
these are large differences, as the table shows. These differences result, in part, from 
significant differences in transportation use and emissions across regions. These 
differences are shown in the Appendix A, which reports gasoline consumption by region 
and income decile.  
Figure 14 compares the change in expenditures and loss in consumer surplus by 
income group for the transport-excluded scenario with our first scenario, the cap-and-
(taxed) dividend. The graph shows the consumer surplus loss before the return of the 
revenues in order to isolate the impact on welfare of excluding transportation from the 
cap-and-trade policy. As can be seen from the graph, the initial increase in expenditures 
and loss in consumer surplus is lower for all 10 deciles when the transportation sector is 
excluded. However, excluding transportation does not create large relative differences 
among the deciles.  
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6.3.2  Excluding Home Heating  
In this scenario we exclude all oil and natural gas used for home heating from the 
cap-and-trade system. Thus, just as in the case where transport is excluded, the carbon 
price must rise to achieve the necessary emissions target. We find that the price in this 
scenario is $42.80 per mtCO2—almost $1.30 higher than under the economywide 
approach, but $0.45 lower than under the transport-excluded scenario. Other sectors have 
to work even harder in this scenario to achieve a given emissions target in order to make 
up for the loss in the home heating sector. 
As in the case where transportation was excluded, the change in expenditures and 
the consumer surplus loss before the distribution of allowance revenues are smaller for 
this scenario than under the economywide cap. Again, this result occurs because the 
higher carbon price in this scenario is more than offset by the fact that a sector is 
exempted from the program. The differences are smaller, however, than in the 
transportation-excluded scenario.  
Once the return of revenues is incorporated, the net consumer surplus loss from 
this scenario is approximately the same size, on average, across all households, as it is in 
the economywide cap-and-(taxed) dividend scenario. The net loss is $822 for an average 
household (1.41 percent of income) compared with $809 (1.39 percent of income) in the 
economywide program (with taxed dividends). Figure 15 shows the national and regional 
impacts from the policy. The net loss of $822 is shown on the bottom row of the table. 
The bar graph makes clear that even with excluding home heating from the program, 
lower-income households are disproportionately harmed by the carbon policy. Only the 
return of revenues reduces the regressivity of the program. Before the remedy, the MSI 
for this scenario is –0.18; after return of revenues, it is 0.13. Thus, overall, the policy is 
progressive and very close to the economywide cap-and-dividend scenario, which had an 
MSI of 0.15.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Figure 15. Excluding Home Heating 
 
 
The regional differences are fairly substantial, especially for the lower-income 
deciles. The tables in Appendices C and D report consumption on natural gas and home 
heating by households in different regions and income groups. The table in Figure 15 
shows that under the policy excluding home heating from the cap-and-trade program the 
lowest two income groups experience a net gain in seven of the regions and a net loss in 
the rest. The Northeast is one of the regions in which the average household incurs a loss, 
but the loss—$50 per year or 0.4 percent of income—is far lower than in the other 
scenarios we examine. Excluding home heating provides a relative benefit in this region 
of the country. Poor households in Texas, California and Nevada, and the Northwest 
experience the largest gain from this policy—in Texas, the average household in the 
bottom two deciles reaps a net benefit of $243, or 2.8 percent of annual income.   
6.3.3  Free Allocation to Electricity Consumers  
Free allocation of allowances on behalf of electricity consumers can be 
accomplished by allocation to local distribution companies (retail utilities), who would 
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Liebeman–Warner bill (SB 2191) as well as other proposals and has been endorsed by the 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.27   
In a recent study Paul et al. (2008) used the Haiku electricity model to examine 
changes in electricity prices with load-based allocation under the Lieberman–Warner cap-
and-trade proposal. Returning allowance value to customers through their local 
distribution companies would raise electricity prices little or not at all, thereby greatly 
reducing the burden of climate policy. However, the small price rise also means that 
consumers receive a weak signal to reduce consumption or invest in improving end-use 
efficiency. In effect, allocation to consumers is a subsidy to electricity consumption that 
raises the overall cost of the cap-and-trade program. As a consequence of the fact that 
consumers do not see higher prices, the amount of reduction necessary elsewhere in the 
economy goes up. Total emissions in the electricity sector rise by 6 percent with free 
allocation to electricity consumers compared with the economywide cap-and-dividend 
policy. Consequently the allowance price increases to $46.68, approximately $5 higher 
than in the central cap-and-dividend case.  
The total expenditure change under load-based allocation is less, on a national 
average basis, than under the economywide cap-and-dividend program. This is because 
electricity consumers are not experiencing the full impact of the carbon price. Once the 
revenues are allocated on a per capita basis, the load-based allocation policy is slightly 
more costly than the economywide cap-and-dividend approach. As shown in the last row 
of the table in Figure 16, an average household experiences a net cost of $918 with load-
based allocation, approximately 1.6 percent of its annual income; this compares with 
$809, 1.4 percent of income, under the cap-and-dividend.  
                                                 
27 Letter to Senators Lieberman and Warner, April 21, 2008. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Figure 16. Free Allocation to Electricity Consumers 
 
 
Appendix B shows the pattern of electricity consumption by region and income 
decile, but these data do not reveal the CO2 emissions associated with electricity 
consumption, which varies across the country and is captured in our modeling. Figure 16 
shows the regional and national impacts of free allocation to electricity consumers by 
income decile after accounting for geographic differences in electricity generation and for 
the free allocation of emissions allowances to consumers on the basis of electricity 
consumption.28 The MSI is 0.11, indicating that the load-based allocation approach is 
slightly progressive. Households in the bottom two deciles incur an average gain in 
consumer surplus of $116, or approximately 1.7 percent of income, but this amount 
varies widely across the regions. In Texas, the gain is as high as $339, while in the 
Northeast, the average household in the bottom two deciles incurs a loss of $221, 1.94 
percent of annual income. 
                                                 
28 The approach we model is allocation to local distribution companies on the basis of consumption, which 
is just one of at least three plausible approaches. Alternatives include allocation on a per capita basis, which 
would be identical to cap-and-dividend, or allocation on the basis of emissions. Paul et al. (2008) show that 
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6.3.4  Investment of Allowance Value in End-Use Efficiency Programs 
Various proposals have called for investment of CO2 revenue to improve end-use 
energy efficiency in the economy. The RGGI, which implements a modest cap-and-trade 
program for electricity generators in 10 northeast states in 2009, requires each state to 
dedicate at least 25 percent of the value of emissions allowances to strategic energy 
initiatives. The European Union has proposed a similar requirement to take effect in the 
third phase of the Emissions Trading Scheme beginning in 2013. In addition, proposed 
federal legislation has a similar provision at the national level in the United States.  
Investment in end-use energy efficiency is expected to reduce energy demand and 
therefore reduce energy prices and the delivered costs of energy services. Ruth et al. 
(2008) use engineering estimates of the opportunity for efficiency improvements to 
analyze the effect of such investments in the State of Maryland and find that these 
investments can virtually offset the increase in electricity price that would otherwise 
result from the state joining RGGI. The Center for Integrative Environmental Research 
(CIER) (2008) conducted a similar analysis for the entire RGGI region and explored 
different levels of efficiency investment. Using a newly estimated structure for demand, 
they find that investing in energy efficiency offsets price increases from a carbon policy 
across the region.  
Starting with a demand model that distinguishes between long-run and short-run 
demand, similar to CIER (2008), we use Haiku to model a program where 25 percent of 
the CO2 revenue collected from the electricity sector nationally is invested to improve 
efficiency in the sector. This revenue subsidizes the purchase of more efficient 
electricity-consuming capital for consumers who are close to indifferent between 
consuming and not consuming additional units of electricity services. This methodology 
takes advantage of information in demand curve that represents the quantity choice 
decision of consumers based on the marginal willingness to pay for electricity 
consumption. For the last unit consumed, the consumer is expected to be approximately 
indifferent between consumption and avoiding consumption at the given retail price of 
electricity. It follows that the consumer would require only small compensation to reduce 
this unit of consumption, and for further demand reduction the consumer would require 
increasing levels of compensation. This information about the marginal willingness to 
accept compensation for demand reduction embodied in the demand curve of consumers 
is used as a proxy for the marginal value of capital investments in end use efficiency, and 
in addition to this cost of compensating the consumer we add a substantial administrative 
cost. Since capital goods that consume electricity are long-lived investments, there are Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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immediate annual demand reductions and a stream of reductions that follow. In our 
model these reductions lead to electricity sector emissions that are 16 percent lower than 
cap-and-dividend emissions for the same price level in 2015. This increased efficiency in 
eliminating CO2 lowers the cost of the program as a whole, driving the allowance price 
down to $37.20. The remainder of the revenue is returned as a per capita dividend. 
Figure 17 illustrates that this policy reduces the size of the average consumer 
surplus loss for the nation as a whole, improves the position of the lowest-income groups, 
and works to equalize the net burden across deciles 3 through 10. The MSI for this policy 
is 0.16, approximately the same as in the cap-and-(taxed) dividend option.  
 
Figure 17. Invest in Efficiency 
 
  
  Again, there are substantial differences for the lower-income households 
across regions. In 8 of 11 regions, households in the bottom two deciles experience a net 
gain from this policy. Only poor households in the Ohio Valley, Florida, and the 
Northeast incur net losses. At opposite ends of the range, poor households in Texas gain, 
on average, $317 or 3.5 percent of annual income, while poor households in the 
Northeast lose $141, or 1.17 percent of income.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Our energy efficiency investment scenario may be a best-case scenario for such a 
policy. There are important institutional challenges to achieving gains from end-use 
efficiency investments. Nonetheless, our modeling suggests that if these challenges can 
be overcome such a policy might have important distributional benefits. 
6.4  Free Allocation to Emitters 
The last scenario we analyze is one in which allowances are given away for free 
to emitters. There are several ways that this can be done. One is on the basis of each 
emitter’s share of production, known as “output-based allocation.” Another is on the 
basis of inputs to production. Moreover, these measures can be updated each period to 
reflect recent economic activity. However, the most common method has been to give 
allowances away for free to incumbent emitters on the basis of historic measures.  
6.4.1  Grandfathering to Incumbent Emitters 
Free allocation to incumbent emitters, often referred to as grandfathering, is 
typically based on a historically observable measure such as emissions, fuel use, or 
economic activity. The first large application of cap-and-trade began with the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments that launched the SO2 trading program, and in that program 
emissions allowances were allocated for free to emitters (incumbent facilities) based on a 
formula that accounted for activity levels (heat input) in a 1985–1987 base period. Free 
allocation based on a historic measure provides no incentive to change behavior in order 
to affect one’s allocation. The value of emissions allowances accrues to the firm 
independent of ongoing economic activity, so it can be viewed as compensation to 
shareholders. 
Other authors have analyzed the distributional consequences of grandfathering 
emissions allowances. Both Dinan and Rogers (2002) and Parry (2004) have shown that 
grandfathering can be extremely regressive because the value of the allowances accrues 
to shareholders, who are predominantly from higher-income households. Our findings are 
consistent with these earlier results. We include the scenario here for comparison 
purposes with our other policy options. 
To model free allocation to emitters we assume the allocation goes to corporate 
entities midstream or upstream in the fuel cycle. We assume allocation goes to fossil-
fired generators (emitters) in the electricity sector. Customers in the electricity sector are 
affected in different ways in different parts of the country depending on the amount they 
spend on electricity, the way price is determined in their regional electricity market, and Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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on the carbon intensity of electricity generation. Burtraw and Palmer (2008) use the 
Haiku electricity market model to analyze the effects of free allocation and find that 
customers in regions of the country under cost-of-service regulation can expect to gain 
the benefit of free allocation through reductions in electricity prices because regulators in 
those regions will apply the value of allowances to offset other changes in costs in the 
wholesale power market. However, firms in competitive regions of the country would 
behave like competitive firms in other sectors, and the prices seen by customers would be 
based on opportunity cost. Hence, in these cases the value of the free allocation accrues 
directly to shareholders.  
With the exception of regulated electricity markets, the value of allowances 
accrues as an increase in shareholder value and will be taxed both at the corporate level 
and personal level. Following Dinan and Rogers (2002), we assign corporate tax 
liabilities to households based on their personal capital income and conclude that the 
government would capture 45 percent of the value distributed through free allocation. 
This is calculated based on an average marginal corporate tax rate of 30 percent, an 
additional 10 percent captured by dividend and capital gains taxes paid by households, 
and 5 percent captured by state and local governments, totaling an amount that exceeds 
the value necessary to keep government whole. We assume that 10.2 percent of the value 
to shareholders accrues to foreign interests (Department of the Treasury 2007). The 
remainder of the value to shareholders is distributed according to the percentage of equity 
held by their income group, which we take from 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances.29 
Finally, the additional 10 percent in taxes that the government collected is redistributed 
via per capita dividend. 
Figure 18 shows the distributional results for the scenario with free allocation to 
emitters. The table in the figure illustrates that the consumer surplus loss from free 
allocation to emitters accrues across the nation. Regional differences stemming from 
differences in electricity regulation are not as important as differences across income 
groups. The greatest impact in terms of percentage of income accrues to the lowest- and 
highest-income groups. The lowest-income groups experience relatively large losses as a 
percentage of income—6.15 percent of income, on average, ranging from 5.12 percent in 
the Northwest to more than 9 percent in the Northeast. The highest-income decile, by 
contrast, enjoys a net consumer surplus gain from this policy. These results are 
attributable to the fact that high-income households hold a relatively large share of 
                                                 
29 http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/oss/oss2/2004/scf2004home.html (accessed May 13, 2008). Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
  49
corporate stock and thus reap most of the benefits of the allowance values. At the national 
level, the MSI is –0.73, further highlighting the regressivity of this policy.  
 
Figure 18. Free Allocation to Emitters 
 
7  Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
To conclude we provide observations, followed by a discussion of the options for 
policymakers and the identification of limitations of the analysis. 
7.1  Observations and Major Trade-Offs 
Climate policy may impose important costs on the economy. For a cap-and-trade 
policy, the primary determinant of how those costs are distributed across the population is 
the allocation of carbon allowances and dispensation of any auctioned carbon revenue. 
This paper has calculated the distributional effects of 10 different carbon policies across 
two demographic dimensions, income and geography. Effects across income groups are 
most concisely illustrated through the calculation of an MSI.30 Table 3 reports the values 
                                                 
30 As a reminder, our Suits Index is modified for two reasons. First, we use consumer surplus loss rather 
than tax payments or expenditure changes, as in the conventional Suits Index. Second, our measure is not 
bounded by –1 and 1 because some of our policies lead to a gain in consumer surplus rather than a loss. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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for the index for the 10 scenarios we have explored. Values greater than zero indicate 
progressivity; values less than zero, regressivity. Essentially there is little variation in the 
initial value of the index, prior to the distribution of the revenue, even when the program 
is designed to exclude sectors, use free allocation, or auction allowances. The table 
indicates that after imposing the cap-and-trade policy that implements a CO2 price 
throughout the economy, the index takes on a value of approximately –0.18, which is 
fairly regressive. Resources for the Future      Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Cap-and-Dividend (Non-Taxable) $41.52 17.06 -0.18 0.05
Cap-and-Dividend (Taxable) $41.52 17.06 -0.18 0.15
Invest in Efficiency $37.20 17.06 -0.18 0.16
Exclude Home Heating $42.80 17.06 -0.18 0.13
Exclude Transportation $43.25 17.06 -0.17 0.06
Expansion of EITC $41.52 17.06 -0.18 0.23
Free Allocation to Emitters $45.65 17.06 -0.18 -0.73
Free Allocation to Electricity Consumers $46.95 17.06 -0.17 0.11
Reduce Income Tax $41.52 17.06 -0.18 -0.79
Reduce Payroll Tax $41.52 17.06 -0.18 -0.33Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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When one explores the way that the program allocates the value of emissions 
allowances, however, the MSI varies considerably across policy cases. The most 
regressive policy is the use of revenue to reduce income taxes, which has an MSI of –
0.79. This value results because we assume a proportional reduction in taxes paid across 
all income groups. The most progressive approach is also tax related. Using some 
allowance revenue to expand the EITC results in an MSI of 0.23. Seven of the policy 
scenarios we analyze are progressive and three are regressive.  
Policymakers face a trade-off between efficiency and distributional equity when 
designing a cap-and-trade program. We evaluate our options for a fixed emissions 
reduction target and then solve for the allowance price necessary to achieve that target. 
This price provides information on the efficiency cost of each policy.  
It is clear from Table 3 that some of our options come with an efficiency cost. The 
options that exclude particular sectors—transportation or home heating—lead to higher 
allowance prices. In effect, the other sectors of the economy have to work harder to 
achieve the targeted emissions reductions. The same is true of the scenario in which 
allowances are allocated free to electricity consumers, though the ramifications here are 
even greater—without getting the low-cost reductions from the electricity sector, we need 
the allowance price to rise even more. Thus, although all three of these options appear 
progressive, once the revenue is returned in a lump sum manner, this increased 
progressivity comes at the expense of efficiency. In contrast, policies that reduce pre-
existing taxes may have efficiency benefits because of the incentives they provide to 
expand labor supply and these benefits are not captured in our framework. However, we 
find these policies are severely regressive. As shown in Table 3, the MSIs for reducing 
payroll and income taxes are both negative, indicating that the policies are regressive. 
Consequently this array of policies illustrates a tradeoff between equity and efficiency in 
the policy choice. 
The scenario in which allowances are allocated free to emitters offers no trade off; 
it is costly and has negative distributional consequences as well. One component of this 
outcome stems from the fact that with free allocation to emitters about 10 percent of the 
allowance value flows overseas to foreign holders of shareholder equity. Also, electricity 
consumers in regions of the country with cost-of-service regulations do not see their 
prices rise as much in this scenario, the allowance price has to be higher to achieve the 
same overall level of emissions reduction. On top of this, since the value of the free Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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allowances accrues primarily to higher-income households, this option is decidedly 
regressive.  
However, the equity-efficiency tradeoff is also not apparent in the policy that 
would invest allowance value to improve efficiency in the end use of energy services. 
This policy is one of the most progressive we examined and would lead to lower 
allowance prices, indicating less cost would be imposed on other sectors of the economy 
in order to achieve the specified climate goal. However, the implementation of this policy 
is the most problematic of any that we consider. Engineering studies and other analysis 
identify ample opportunities to improve efficiency at relatively low cost. From an 
economic perspective, for such opportunities to exist would depend on persistent market 
failures or institutional failures. It is unclear whether the direct investment of allowance 
value in energy efficiency could overcome those failures and improve the efficiency of 
energy use in a cost effective manner, and indeed what institutions could be employed to 
achieve this result. Hence, we conclude that further consideration of this policy design is 
one of the most fruitful areas for further research. 
Figure 19 shows a comparison of the impacts across income deciles at the 
national level of all 10 policy scenarios. Again, the dark blue shows the consumer surplus 
loss as a fraction of annual household income before distribution of the revenues, and the 
lighter blue shows the net consumer surplus loss after the revenues have been returned. 
The bar graphs clearly show that three options do little or nothing to reduce the 
regressivity of the carbon pricing policy: free allocation to emitters, reducing the income 
tax, and reducing the payroll tax. All three of these options reduce the cost of the 
policy—that is, the lighter bar lies below the darker one—but do not change the relative 
incidence. Most of the other options greatly reduce the burden on the lowest deciles and 
equalize the loss as a fraction of income across deciles. In several of these options—both 
cap-and-dividend cases and the two exclusion cases—these impacts result from the lump 
sum redistribution of the revenues. In the EITC scenario, the benefit of the tax credit goes 
to lower-income households. Finally, in cases where sectors are excluded or where 
money is spent on energy efficiency, the benefits are a combination of lower initial price 
increases and lump sum per capita redistributions of carbon allowance revenue.  Resources for the Future      Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Figure 19. Incidence of Alternative Cap-and-Trade Policies across Income Deciles:  Net Consumer Surplus Loss as a 
Fraction of Annual Household Income Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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The policy scenarios also have different effects across regions of the country, and 
the biggest regional differences are for poor households. Households in the bottom two 
income deciles in the Northeast, Ohio Valley, and Florida are consistently harmed more 
than households in the bottom two deciles in other regions. The differences are 
particularly large for some policy cases: for example, welfare costs for poor households 
from the EITC expansion policy range from $120 per year in the Northeast to –$600 in 
Texas; free allocation to electricity consumers has welfare costs of $221 in the Northeast 
and –$339 in Texas. For average households, the differences in costs of the policy 
options are not as great, especially as a percentage of income. Average households in the 
Northwest (Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, and Washington) and California/Nevada are 
harmed less than average households in other regions. Average households in the Plains, 
the Ohio Valley, Florida, and the Northeast are usually harmed more, but on a percentage 
of income basis, the range is not large.  
While the case for equity across income groups is straightforward, interregional 
equity is somewhat complicated. To the extent that some regions have already enacted 
policies to reduce their carbon footprint, one can make the case that their citizens deserve 
any extraordinary benefits incentive-based policies would bring them. On the other hand, 
there is considerable resource and lifestyle heterogeneity across regions, and some states 
do not have the resources available to reduce their carbon consumption quite so easily. 
Despite the ambiguity over the merits of interregional equity, there is no doubt that the 
relative burden of climate policy across regions will shape political considerations as 
such policies come to fruition.  
Figure 20 includes the same information as Figure 19 except that we now show 
the consumer surplus loss as a fraction of total annual household consumption rather than 
annual income. As we explained in section 2, it has long been argued by economists that 
some measure of lifetime, or permanent, income is a better measure of ability to pay than 
is annual income. Since information on lifetime income is difficult to come by, however, 
many studies have used consumption as a proxy. Consumption has its own problems, but 
we show our results for purposes of comparison with our results based on income. Resources for the Future      Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Figure 20.  Incidence of Alternative Cap-and-Trade Policies across Income Deciles:  Net Consumer Surplus Loss as a 
Fraction of Annual Household Consumption 
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Clearly, all of the policy scenarios now look much less regressive before return of 
the revenues than they did in Figure 19. Pricing carbon appears to have about an equal 
impact, in terms of consumer surplus loss as a percentage of consumption, across income 
deciles. Thus, the policy looks approximately proportional. Returning the revenues makes 
the policy appear progressive in most cases—that is, the graph shows that the lighter blue 
bars get larger as income increases. The only scenarios in which this does not hold are, as 
expected, the scenario in which emitters get free allocation and the scenarios in which 
income or payroll taxes are reduced. These findings are consistent with others who have 
found that the regressivity of many taxes is muted when consumption is used in place of 
income. 
7.2  Options for Policymakers 
The results presented in this paper represent bookend examples of potential 
climate policy design and revenue recycling programs. Rather than offering a normative 
ranking of the relative merits of each policy, this paper should be viewed as a menu of 
policy options. Each scenario is potentially viable on its own, but policymakers are likely 
to mix and match components of each approach to temper the magnitude or scope of the 
incidence of climate policy. For example, we analyzed each remedy individually and 
assumed that remaining funds would be returned as a dividend back to people on a per 
capita basis. However, programs such as investments in energy efficiency and expansion 
of the EITC could be undertaken simultaneously. Or, as opposed to redistributing all of 
the CO2 revenue raised, some portion of it could be used to fund other endeavors, such as 
development of new transportation system or electricity infrastructure.  
Although climate change is a long-run problem, climate policy has an important 
short-run political dynamic. Therefore, delivering compensation or finding ways to 
alleviate disproportional burdens of the policy seems especially important in the early 
years of climate policy. Similarly, if all politics are local, then the local and regional 
affects of policy may be fundamentally important to building the political coalition 
necessary to enact climate policy. While temporal and marginal shifts may be nonlinear, 
in the short run the direction and magnitude of our results can be viewed as scalable over 
a reasonable range of prices or carbon reduction targets.  
7.3  Limitations and Research Needs 
Although we feel that our work is more detailed and comprehensive than previous 
literature on this topic, there are a number of uncertainties and limitations to our results Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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that we hope to address in future work. Some of the important issues that should be 
considered include 
•  Further explorations into proxies for lifetime income rather than strict use 
of annual income as a measure of ability to pay.  
•  Expansion of the model to account for secondary effects and the interplay 
with labor and capital markets. 
•  Examination of interregional income and price differences to better isolate 
the true incidence of the policies; CEX data reliability at the regional level 
is uncertain in some cases, especially for the five states that are not 
included in the regional analysis because of small samples. 
•  Further exploration into modifications of the remedies we have included 
and analysis of alternative remedies. 
•  Sensitivity analyses of some parameters such as the various elasticities we 
use to calculate consumer surplus losses. 
Finally, a policy that direct allowance value to improve the efficiency in the end 
use of energy is the most promising in terms of resolving the tradeoff between equity and 
economic efficiency. However, the institutions that would be employed to implement this 
policy are unclear. This policy may be one of the most fruitful areas for further research 
and analysis.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Appendix A 
Gasoline (Gallons) Consumption by Decile and Region
Decile 99
R e g i o n S t a t e s 123456789 1 0 Mean
Southeast AL, AR, DC, GA, LA, MS, 
NC, SC, TN, VA
424 585 778 952 1,026 1,206 1,341 1,387 1,692 1,631 1,082
CNV CA, NV 338 592 737 863 968 1,109 1,272 1,383 1,657 1,833 1,172
TX TX 543 679 832 1,082 1,216 1,275 1,431 1,533 1,715 1,887 1,235
FL FL 494 521 662 860 976 1,064 1,150 1,373 1,614 1,536 1,009
Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MS, OH, 
WV, WI
373 464 658 822 930 1,062 1,305 1,397 1,644 1,743 1,070
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 403 366 537 752 815 985 1,119 1,268 1,339 1,562 971
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 379 481 634 711 841 934 1,114 1,309 1,454 1,654 1,046
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 513 458 670 820 981 1,062 1,160 1,298 1,403 1,555 1,029
NY NY 332 345 432 625 806 926 954 1,246 1,336 1,457 894
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 420 513 678 748 945 1,004 1,280 1,363 1,444 1,806 1,078
Mountains AZ, CO 438 487 664 763 847 1,003 1,272 1,296 1,418 1,706 993




Electricity (KWh) Consumption by Decile and Region
Decile 99
R e g i o n S t a t e s 123456789 1 0 Mean
Southeast AL, AR, DC, GA, LA, MS, 
NC, SC, TN, VA
13,177 14,788 16,406 18,045 18,454 18,833 19,703 20,749 22,109 24,666 18,540
CNV CA, NV 5,287 6,137 6,079 6,893 7,513 7,604 8,685 9,831 11,089 14,858 8,982
TX TX 9,814 10,788 13,080 13,957 15,306 16,804 17,731 18,777 22,419 27,251 16,741
FL FL 11,000 12,443 14,187 15,134 14,501 16,791 17,438 18,946 22,098 26,070 16,606
Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MS, OH, 
WV, WI
9,386 11,079 12,275 12,918 13,364 14,781 15,150 16,535 17,440 21,735 14,662
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 8,256 9,280 10,632 11,409 12,550 13,190 15,284 16,283 16,792 21,634 14,129
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 4,666 6,819 6,752 6,856 7,425 7,789 8,830 10,063 11,722 14,569 9,188
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 6,933 11,228 11,185 12,677 14,037 13,936 14,819 16,412 18,029 19,659 14,211
NY NY 5,139 6,126 5,995 7,710 8,921 8,263 9,327 10,170 11,936 14,635 9,204
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 6,749 7,759 9,311 10,446 10,926 13,234 14,498 14,686 14,572 22,878 13,066
Mountains AZ, CO 8,704 10,353 10,539 11,969 13,088 14,652 15,715 15,914 17,379 19,706 13,845
National 7,313 9,828 11,138 12,305 12,859 13,656 14,572 15,585 16,899 20,298 13,445Resources for the Future      Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Appendix C 
Natural Gas (Cubic feet) Consumption by Decile and Region
Decile 99
R e g i o n S t a t e s 123456789 1 0 Mean
Southeast AL, AR, DC, GA, LA, MS, 
NC, SC, TN, VA
30 34 30 31 30 41 33 46 60 74 40
CNV CA, NV 24 24 27 32 33 37 39 45 53 68 41
TX TX 20 21 22 25 27 28 28 32 37 58 30
F L F L 2224234236 3
Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MS, OH, 
WV, WI
49 59 64 64 75 80 80 89 97 131 80
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 35 44 43 51 58 53 57 59 77 101 60
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 23 38 39 40 32 49 34 39 40 54 40
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 15 27 31 35 40 47 63 64 70 84 50
NY NY 22 34 26 31 36 46 45 51 63 67 44
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 36 40 52 62 81 81 90 98 110 137 82
Mountains AZ, CO 30 39 40 42 44 47 55 72 66 96 53
N a t i o n a l 2 23 13 53 84 14 74 85 56 38 2 4 6  Resources for the Future      Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Appendix D 
Fuel Oil (Gallons) Consumption by Decile and Region
Decile 99
R e g i o n S t a t e s 123456789 1 0 Mean
Southeast AL, AR, DC, GA, LA, MS, 
NC, SC, TN, VA
43 40 52 42 53 55 38 52 67 83 52
CNV CA, NV 12 14 15 14 11 25 30 47 28 40 25
TX TX 10 16 15 10 16 27 23 26 18 18 18
FL FL 9 14 5 9 13 8 16 15 30 28 14
Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MS, OH, 
WV, WI
23 34 34 50 54 44 54 40 86 64 49
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 130 168 146 130 110 131 162 156 128 207 149
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 175 353 242 374 395 233 381 400 505 667 397
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 20 25 22 47 39 62 38 66 58 58 45
NY NY 49 229 95 163 212 154 280 266 305 514 244
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 9 22 45 8 11 26 34 18 50 67 30
Mountains AZ, CO 16 16 22 36 19 12 27 50 8 15 22
N a t i o n a l 3 87 15 97 07 77 39 19 3 1 1 4 1 4 8 8 3  
 